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Extremes of Engagement:  
The post-classical public relations of the Islamic State  
1. Introduction 
The importance of digital communications in the recruitment processes of Islamic extremist 
groups was anticipated by Hiebert (2005, p. 8) in a keynote speech at Bledcom 2004, in which he 
spoke of “landmines ahead” in the convergence of new technologies, public relations (PR) and 
democracy, with fast internet used to “revolutionalize the recruiting of angry and disaffected 
audiences.” The success of IS’s recruitment communications has led to the group being labelled 
“masters of the digital universe” (Atwan, 2015, p. 15) and while for one scholar of extreme Islam,  
the claim contained a degree of hyperbole, the consensus remains that some young people in the 
West respond to “slick propaganda distributed online” (Mortimer, 2015, p.10).  This article 
presents a conceptual analysis of the communications content, systems and processes used by IS 
to engage with young people in its recruitment outreach. The analytical component included a 
consideration of the elements of classical public relations –  managed communication, persuasion 
and the building of relationships with stakeholders as defined by Bernays (1945),  Grunig and Hunt 
(1984) and others – that are being used by IS. This line of analysis also sought to identify any 
innovations the group has made in its recruitment outreach that may be of wider interest to the 
field of public relations and the result is offered as a contribution to the emerging literature on the 
public relations aspects of violent extremism. 
1.1 Literature Review: The Communicative Dimension of Terrorism 
The communicative dimension of terrorism is a suitable theme for public relations (PR) 
scholarship because in definitional terms “terrorism is essentially a message” (Matusitz, 2013, p.  
xvii.) that depends on public relations – or at least promotional media relations – in order to gain 
the coverage it needs to achieve awareness. This media relations aspect was discussed in Public 
Relations Review over 30 years ago, when Rada (1985) identified the “symbiotic, if different, 
relationship with the mass media” of both public relations and terrorism in the way both depend 
upon third party coverage to achieve communicative goals. This commonality has resulted in the 
literature on terrorist communication adopting theoretical frames familiar to public relations 
scholars, such as  Tuman’s (2003, p. 19) model for “the rhetorical dimensions of terrorism,” using  
language and theoretical framing similar to that of Heath (2000, p. 69) in his Aristotlean-derived 
perspective of public relations as rhetoric. The two elements were combined in the 2008 edited 
book (O’Hair, Heath, Ayotte & Ledlow, 2008) in which the authors sought to “invigorate inquiry 
that interprets terrorism not only as an event but also as a process that is always and already 
communicative and rhetorical.” More recently, a 2014 special edition of Public Relations Inquiry 
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presented “a diverse range of perspectives that add considerable texture to the understandings of 
the complex relationships between and among concepts of public relations, propaganda and 
terrorism” (L’Etang, Xifra & Coombs, 2014, p. 140). This collection also raised the potential for 
some interchangeability of terms in the context of terrorism in the same way as in the use of the 
terms information, public relations and propaganda in PR history (L’Etang, 1998, p. 41; L’Etang, 
2004, p. 83; Thompson, 2015, p. 246). At Bledcom 2015, Galloway (2016) added a new layer to 
the definitional debate with his point that “IS media is not propaganda in the western sense but 
rather propagation of a minoritarian ‘take’ on Islam” and that while the group’s “diverse media 
output is not western-style public relations, the artifice and artefacts employed are not only relevant 
but also noteworthy for public relations professionals.” This author accepts these preceding 
definitional guidelines and the related interchangeability of terms, adding that writers from outside 
the PR field - from terrorism studies, international relations and security fields – have used varied 
terms to describe the communications output of terrorist groups. Significantly, literature on 
terrorist communications and public relations writing on the same theme has excluded work on 
activism, which is quite separate from terrorism due to the political activist’s emphasis on peaceful 
and political activity rather that violence, which is in contrast the starting point for the terrorist. 
This approach to the ontology of terrorist communications leads to a stance that acknowledges 
that while IS recruitment communications is not purely public relations, it does contain elements 
of public relations discourse, as defined by Quintana and Xifra (2016, p. 288).   
1.2 The Seriality of Islamic Terror Groups 
The Islamic State emerged from a 30- year heritage of formation, mergers and offshore franchising 
of violent groups in Africa and the Middle East. Al Qaeda was first exponent of a style of terrorism 
that went beyond the 1960-1980 classical era of regional or ideological groups recruiting locally 
and undertaking terrorist acts primarily in that locality, such as the Basque separatists ETA and the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA). In contrast, post-classical terrorist groups adopted a global outlook, 
emphasised propaganda of the deed, interaction with global media infrastructures such as satellite 
television and the internet, and a transnational approach to recruitment (Wieviorka, 2007, p. 92). 
By 2000, the era of global terrorism was well entrenched with a focus on attacking the US and the 
West - the far enemy in Osama bin-Laden’s terms (Gerges, 2005).  The attacks were delivered by 
transnational actors who were at home in countries including Belgium, France, Germany and “the 
England of Londistan and its mosques where the most radical speechifying went unchecked” 
(Wieviorka, 2012, p. 55).  
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After US forces began a wholesale withdrawal from Iraq between 2007 and 2012, Al Qaeda in Iraq 
under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi emerged as the dominant force in the ensuing 
insurgency.  The violence culminated in what has been described by one US State Department 
adviser as the “blood year” of 2014 (Kilcullen, 2016), in which the re-named Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) under the leadership of the Iraqi cleric Abu Bakr al-Bagdadhi (operating separately 
from Al Qaeda’s central command) began a murderous rampage through Northern Iraq that 
culminated in the seizure of Mosul, the country’s second-biggest city. IS was swift to breach the 
border with Syria and soon controlled much of eastern Syria from its self-proclaimed capital, 
Raqqa. At the end of 2015, IS dominated an area the size of Britain and “its recruiting prowess 
now dwarfed that of Al Qaeda, a group with 20 years more experience in the terror business. The 
style of the self-declared caliphate, whether in dress, speech or cruelty, is what wannabe jihadists 
everywhere now aspire to” (“The propaganda war”, 2015).  
1.3 Research aims 
Against this background of existing work on the communicative dimension of terrorism and the 
Islamic State’s development, this project sought to shed light on IS recruitment communications 
through an institutional analysis of the public relations systems used to propagate its recruitment 
messages. IS recruitment communication is an extreme example of public relations as applied 
social science and persuasion, that “motivates an individual or group to a specific course of action 
by creating, changing or reinforcing opinions and attitudes” (Bernays, 1923, p.24) to the  extent 
that recruits are persuaded to kill and die themselves for the cause. This investigation attempted 
to place IS recruitment communications within existing theoretical categorisations such as 
persuasion and symmetrical communications, as defined in Grunig and Hunt’s (1984, p. 22) four 
models of public relations, as well as consider how its efficacy has been derived from new 
approaches. More broadly, the article aimed to offer reflection on how IS has extended the 
boundaries of public communication and suggests that some aspects of its template for post-
classical public relations may be applicable to other spheres beyond terrorism.   
2. Methodology 
The core methodology was a contemporary history approach to investigate IS’s recruitment 
communications by applying the historical institutionalist frame to research the messages of IS and 
the mechanisms of support that distributed them. Historical institutionalism is particularly well-
suited to political, campaigning and state-like organisations, however, the currency of the object 
of the investigation and the geopolitical and legal barriers to access in the Islamic State led to 
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adoption of a mixed research approach deploying two supplementary methodologies in order to 
understand the effects of IS propaganda operations  
2.1 Historical institutionalism 
Variants of the research approach based on historical institutionalist theory have appeared in 
critical public relations projects (see Fredriksson, Pallas and Wehmeier, 2013; Frandsen and 
Johansen, 2013 and others in the neo-institutionalism special section of Public Relations Inquiry in 
May 2013) as well in public relations history projects (Sandhu, 2015; Bentele and Wiesenburg, 
2016). Beyond public relations, the research methodology based on historical institutionalist theory 
has been widely adopted in politics and the social sciences because of its focus on the “symbol 
systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide frames of meaning” (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, p. 947).  The role of the agents (such as leaders and supporters) in internalising and 
transmitting these scripts (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 946) and the changing relationship between 
ideas, agents and audiences over time made this approach relevant to the study of IS. Historical 
institutionalism has been advocated as a “valuable addition to the communication scholar’s 
theoretical toolbox” by Bannerman and Haggart (2015, p. 2) and their sequential methodology, as 
summarised below, was used to organise this project: 
1. Select the institution for study and time period. (Islamic State from June 2014-June 2016). 
2. Identify the institutional ideas. (The core ideology and messages of IS).  
3. Identify agents/actors. (IS leaders and communications actors)   
4. Identify supporting mechanisms. (IS PR institutions and distribution systems). 
5. Identify overall institutional effects. (The communications and recruitment effects).   
2.2 Discursive institutionalism 
Because of the orientation of this project to recruitment communications, a secondary 
methodology of discourse analysis, or more specifically discursive institutionalism, was deployed 
to identify and unpack IS’s styles and genres of language, using Fairclough’s terms and definition 
of discourse as a particular view of language “as an element of social life which is closely 
interconnected with other elements” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 3). Discursive institutionalism aligned 
the institutional and public relations discourse elements of the investigation in a methodologically 
coherent manner that accounted for the way IS actors (such as the group’s leaders, publishers and 
members) “use language and symbols to structure their environments through discourse practices 
or language systems” (Atkinson, 2008, p. 361). The further refinement by Atkinson (2008, p. 284) 
5 
 
that language can be used to “represent connectedness to a particular discourse community or set 
of beliefs” through use of an appropriate “discourse kit” was also relevant to the consideration of 
IS. This frame was used to interpret styles of rhetoric and genres of language, such as the focus on 
statehood, the use of street language and the use of Arabic terms form the Koran to describe core 
ideological propositions such as hijrah, kalifah and jihad. 
Step five is the identification of the institutional recruitment discourse behind the recruitment 
propositions of IS and the mechanisms that led to its propagation. Methodologically, this involved 
seeking out evidence in the form of recruitment literature in English and textual elements in both 
primary material produced by IS, including its Dabiq magazine, the Islamic State Annual Report along 
with material posted or re-posted on social media by IS media institutions.  In analysing the 
recruitment materials, the content analysis approach deployed by Baines and O’Shaughnessy (2014, 
p. 169) on Al Qaeda’s communications output was adopted to consider the artefacts at the content, 
propaganda and semiotic levels  
2.3 Background interviews and review of court transcripts 
In order to consider and assess the institutional effects in step six, secondary texts such as media 
coverage and court records of prosecutions of IS recruits (containing verbatim statements and 
cross-examinations) from the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service were reviewed to identify to what 
extent the core messages and styles of language of IS’s institutional discourse fed through into the 
recruitment communications and its effect on recruits. In addition to interpretive analysis of court 
records,  interview transcripts from broadcast interviews, personal accounts published in media 
sources and ten interviews conducted by ethnographic film-makers with extremists and those they 
have tried to recruit.  The author also held background discussions with two UK-based Imams 
who have worked on anti-extremist projects and two lawyers who have worked on UK court cases 
involving violent extremism prosecutions linked to IS in the UK courts. 
 The Islamic State’s institutional identity: A nomenclature of claim     
The foundation of the Islamic State’s recruitment appeal is the messianic naming (or corporate 
identity in public relations terms) of the institution itself that makes a series of strategic claims. 
There is a communicative efficiency in the two-word nomenclature of claim, “Islamic State,” that 
simultaneously asserts the group’s Islamism, statehood and the proposition of a caliphate (kalifah) 
for the global Muslim community (ummah).  This three-way strategic claim was made concrete in 
June 2014 when IS secured Mosul, Iraq’s second city and advanced with an operational momentum 
reflected in its slogan of “hold and expand”.  The literalism of the name Islamic State combines 
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inclusion and exclusion in a divisive way that intensifies the value of belonging to the group for 
Muslims while simultaneously annexing those not involved. Interestingly, a former public relations 
professional, UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, recognised the power of the naming strategy 
(“David Cameron criticises BBC for use of Islamic state”, 2016) and started using the term Daesh 
in late 2015 because “British Muslims are appalled by Daesh…these people are not Muslims” (HC 
Deb. 2 Dec 2015). While Cameron’s aim of distinguishing between mainstream Islam and the 
politicised extremism of IS may be well-intentioned, it is not accurate to claim that jihadi 
recruitment messages have no association with the religion as any “total dismissal of the 
(puritanical) Islamic identity of the groups does not stand up to scrutiny” (El-Badawy, Comerford 
& Welby, 2015, p. 15) and is rather at the heart of the ideology IS uses to target recruits.     
[Figure] A conceptual model of the recruitment communications system of the Islamic State used 
to engage with young people online. 
3. Core Islamic State ideology 
4.1 Migration  
The core ideology of the Islamic State combines themes of religion, history and prophecy with 
recruitment outreach offering the immediate prospect of a new and agreeable community for 
Muslims. Migration to the Middle East from the land of unbelievers is part of mainstream Islamic 
doctrine and a message carried to extremes by IS which puts migration at the heart of its 
recruitment communications. A 2015 article in its English-language magazine Dabiq explicitly 
made the case for coming to the caliphate:  
‘Now with the presence of Islamic State, the opportunity to perform hijrah from darul-kufr 
to darul-Islam (the land of Islam) and wage jihad against the Crusaders is available to every 
Muslim as well as the chance to live under the shade of the Sharia alone. 
(“The extinction of the grey zone”, 2015) 
“Come Forth to Your State” is the banner on several IS web sites such as Halummu (2016, but 
since suspended) and the recruitment appeal for leaving the West has been the portrayal of 
Muslims in general and Sunni Muslims in particular as underdogs and victims of racism. This 
central recruitment message appears frequently in in-house publications that show fighters sharing 
comradeship, such as issue 11 of Dabiq which captioned a photograph of Asian and Arab fighters 
as illustrating wala and bara (loyalty and disavowal) in the caliphate in contrasted with racism in 
America (“Wala and bara versus American racism”, 2015)  
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4.2 The establishment of a caliphate  
The khalifah messaging has several dimensions, which draw on historical and prophetic aspects of 
Islam to appeal to recruits while excluding non-believers (kuffirs). A typical call for the caliphate to 
be left to prosper was made by Mohammed Emwazi, the IS fighter known as Jihadi John, in the 
Message to America video, that was released online on 19 August 2014 to Youtube (since deleted) to 
accompany the execution of American journalist James Foley:  
You are no longer fighting an insurgency. We are an Islamic army and a state. Any attempt 
by you, Obama, to deny the Muslims their rights of living safely under the Islamic caliphate 
will result in bloodshed. (“James Foley: Islamic State militants behead reporter, 2014”) 
Assurance that IS has the capability of running the new caliphate is part of its recruitment appeal.  
This focus on the run-time phase of the caliphate has included state-of the nation type addresses, 
such as that given by IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in November 2014, when he told an 
audience:  “Your state is well and in the best of conditions. Its advance will not cease” (Walt, 2015). 
These pronouncements are supplemented by the annual Islamic State Report publication which 
presents a utopian view of the caliphate and is targeted at potential recruits (Al-Hayat Media 
Center, 2014).  
4.3 The quest for holy war and martyrdom  
In order to add urgency to the recruitment messaging, while the kalifah is presented as an idealised 
haven for Muslims, it is also depicted as under threat of attack from enemies in the West and 
locally. This faux defence narrative is used as the excuse for waging holy war and in appeals for 
recruits. Jihad is mentioned 41 times in the Quran and IS recruitment communications cite these 
texts in its calls for young men to fight to protect women and children in the caliphate, as well as 
mounting pre-emptive strikes against the West. Recruitment videos are often accompanied by 
vocal anthems (nasheeds) recorded without musical instruments (which are prohibited by IS), which 
combine outreach to recruits with inspiration for activists, as illustrated in this extract published 
by Ajnad Media in 2014, which stresses the humiliation of Muslims in the material world of the 
West compared with the nobility of jihad in the caliphate.  
A life of humiliation no, I am not content with it. 
But love of death in glory is an aspiration. 
And indeed death is in the path of Jihad.  (Al-Tamimi, 2015) 
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5. The recruitment messages of the Islamic State  
5.1. Money and comfort 
A compelling proposition in the taxonomy of narratives used for recruitment is the offer of 
housing in the Islamic State, a job and pay of up to $500 a month, which is more than three times 
the rate of other rebel groups and an attractive offer to young people who may struggle to find 
fulfilling work in the West (Cambanis, 2014).  This financial security makes the decision to journey 
to Syria easier, particularly if funds are made available to assist with travel costs.  IS’s spending 
power in Syria means that recruits wage holy war in a state of relative comfort that was described 
by Iftekhar Jaman, a former call centre worker in the UK, as “5-star jihad”, a moniker echoed in 
recruitment videos showing the 5-star hotel in Mosul captured by IS. 
5.2  Power and kinship 
The starting point for engaging recruits is a message of empowerment and a sense that IS can offer 
inclusion to outsiders, including victims of racism. A barrister in the UK with experience of several 
extremist trials,  described one male defendant as a chronically lonely young man who became 
withdrawn following the divorce of his parents and had been vulnerable to online recruitment 
approaches (Anon,  2015a, personal communication).  Initial recruitment appeals prey on these 
types of vulnerabilities in young people and stress the prospect of kinship, in which the terms 
brother and sister are used to indicate fictive kin. IS’s message of empowerment is a shrewd appeal 
to Western Muslims, who often feel unwelcome as a 17-year old English woman explains: 
If we look at the media there is lot going on around Islamophobia At a young age when 
you are vulnerable and have all this Islamophobia and racism around you and so they feel 
like they do not have a future and they feel they are not welcome – and so that attracts 
them to it (IS).   (Butt, 2015)  
5.3. Adventure and ultraviolence  
Evidence from criminal trials confirms that some recruits have an interest in violence, guns) and 
may have criminal pasts (Proto, 2015).   Recent recruitment outreach does seem to target a less 
religious group of hard core sadistic adventurers and thrill seekers. According to Belgian counter 
terrorism specialist, Rik Coolsaet, IS is “a new outlet for deviant behaviour” in a “no future 
atmosphere,” while Mohamed Azaitraoui, a Muslim counsellor in Brussels has described the 
recruitment appeal as a “delectable myth” that offers salvation in Syria and allows then to play out 
a fantasy wargame in which they are invincible Rambos. (de Carbonnel, 2015) 
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5.4 Sexual Opportunity 
By encouraging marriages between volunteers from overseas, providing captive wives and sex 
slaves, joining IS offers sexual opportunities, adding to an already compelling recruitment package 
of accommodation, cash, camaraderie, status and the excitement of battle (Ali, 2015). The writer 
and comedian Shazia Mirza has captured the sense of sexual excitement among women leaving 
Britain for IS. 
These ISIS men, as barbaric as they are, they’re hot. They are macho, hairy, they’ve got 
guns, they’re exciting. They are the One Direction of Islam. They are pop stars, pinups and 
sex symbols, and these repressed, rebellious, horny teenage girls fancy them, so they buy 
themselves a one-way ticket to Syria for some halal sex and no guilt because Allah 
approves. It’s not radicalisation it’s sexualisation. (Mirza, 2016, p. 22) 
Imran Khwaja was a bodybuilder and British jihadi who appeared in Islamic State recruitment 
videos holding human heads and went on to fake his own death but was arrested on return to 
Dover.  Whilst in Syria, Khwaja wrote to friends in West London requesting cocoa butter, 
toothpaste, soap and condoms in order to take full advantage of his “war booty” (Davies, 2015).  
6. The Islamic State media system 
IS recruitment messages and their distribution are controlled by the Islamic State Institute of Public 
Information (ISIPI), in a media system that combines digital public relations, in-house publications 
and social media promotion.  Until his death in August 2016 following a US air strike, Abu 
Muhammed al-Adnani, a Sheikh of the Islamic State and the group’s spokesperson, oversaw this 
“horribly imaginative propaganda machine that magnifies the menace” of IS (“Unfriended,” 2015).   
The production and distribution of different types of visual and verbal content is undertaken by a 
range of affiliate media centres, with Al-Hayat being the best known in the West for its English 
language videos, while Al-Furqan fulfils a similar role in the Arab world, producing output in 
Arabic. This media distribution infrastructure consists of multiple twitter feeds - estimated at 
46,000 in one study (Morgon & Berger, 2015) - to publicise video content by passing on links to 
the various servers hosting publications and videos.  IS has built apps to make it easier to follow 
its recruitment outreach such as the Dawn of Glad Tidings Arab language app and an Android 
app for the group’s online al-Bayan radio that enable automatic re-tweeting of content using 
hashtags as well as automated Twitter Bots or robot programmes. IS supporters undertaking this 
work are several layers below the central command levels of its digital PR operation and these 
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globally-dispersed advocates disseminate the radical message and convert people cause in their role 
as “Islamic State’s echo chamber”  (Cohen, 2015, p. 53).   
6.1 Verbal and Visual Content  
The core ideology is the foundation for the verbal content which works alongside the visual aspect 
of IS recruitment communications. Violent videos of beheadings are widely understood to be the 
main media output of IS much more of the visual output adopts a public information style that 
promotes the workings of the proto-state, showing banks, courts, oil trading and health services. 
IS makes regular references to readily recognisable elements of Western visual culture in its 
recruitment outreach in order to provide easy access points to their messaging. Some sequences 
of video, such as the fast-moving scenes of violence from the hour-long Flames of War film, make 
reference to video games, such as Grand Theft Auto, with the inference that recruits will be 
participating in the real version of an exciting computer game. The visual grammar of IS video 
results in  a specific aesthetic that blends video games, music video and rap culture in a way that 
appeals to young recruits and is “semi-professional and probably done by young people who have 
studied media or film somewhere” according to one film-maker (Macrae, 2016).  
Recruitment communications & process 
7.1 Scanning and listening 
The first stage of IS’s recruitment process is a phase of intense listening coupled with an 
understanding of the recurring issues troubling young people. The Islamic State is skilled at 
identifying sad and angry young people by scanning social media for posts, likes and affinities 
which can be used to make an initial link. Recruiters seek out different personality types based on 
keyword searches of social media profiles and the likes given to the characters of TV shows and 
video games. Dounia Bouzar, an anthropologist who works with France’s Ministry of the Interior 
claims that “show differing utopias to young people,” according to Bouzar, who has seen appeals 
based on computer games such as the Assasin’s Creed and Call of Duty, as well as characters from 
the Lord of the Rings (Mevel & Labbe, 2015).   
This intense level of micro-segmentation to build an affinity with a potential recruit may seem 
laborious but automated search tools accelerate the process and, despite the devious nature of this 
online grooming, the initial approach is often notable only for its casual style:   
I was on Twitter and I guess went into it like that. I guess my Snapchat must have been on 
my Twitter bio and they contacted me on that. It was not really as clichéd as people think 
it was. It was not a “hey come join us” type thing. It was more of a “Hey sister. How are 
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you doing? Are you well? InshAllāh, (God-willing). All these things. It was like a 
conversation with your friend. It was like a normal thing.    (Anon, 2015b) 
7.2 Engagement  
Once a potential recruit is engaged, some IS recruiters swiftly move to a phase of almost constant 
communication, passing on instructions and exhortations in an intense verbal bombardment. 
Hundreds of hours can be spent in Skype conversations and other online dialogue to build an 
intimate connection, which can overwhelm young recruits. One Imam reported to the author that 
target recruits he has counselled typically report 12-20 hours or more per week of contact time 
invested by online recruiters.  These recruitment approaches rarely start with radical Islamism and 
focus instead on the idea of sisterhood, adventure, building a new society in which you will belong 
and be valued as a Muslim.   
7.3 Action 
Once the online relationships is established - or has been moved to real-world meetings in support 
groups - and is friendly and supportive, it becomes easy for discussions to progress to the idea of 
travelling, especially if the initial flight to Turkey is funded by IS. The instantaneous and fast-paced 
nature of social media can contribute to overcoming barriers that to outsiders may seem 
momentous and linked fundamentally to ideology, but such speed is a technologically deterministic 
feature of online media for activities such as dating and the same level of acceleration can be 
observed in transcripts of online exchanges between IS recruiters and potential targets.  
7. Discussion 
The analysis and model of the Islamic State’s recruitment communications provides a stimulant 
for theorising about the ways in which IS is an extremist example of the broader emergence of a 
post-classical style of public relations that features five commonalities: a mixed repertoire of 
approaches; the rhetoric of certainty and division; computational and data-driven PR; online 
engagement and advocacy by supporters; a performative dimension to public communication.  
In the terms of existing PR taxonomy, IS deploys the template of classic Grunigian managed 
communications, but instead of fitting one of the typologies, it adopts a mixed communicative 
repertoire of all four approaches and supplements this with additions which bring modernity and 
efficacy. The classical elements include the propaganda of the press agentry in one-way distribution 
of public information, persuasion plus manipulation in the two-way asymmetrical communications 
and then the mutual understanding shown in the symmetric recruitment outreach. All levels of this 
classically-derived communication show a public relations approach in the segmentation of 
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messages for different stakeholders. The divisive rhetoric of IS is also post-classical in the way it 
is unconcerned with promoting dialogue or contributing to a fully functioning society as 
envisioned by Heath (2000).  Instead, rhetoric is used to dominate, to convey certainty about the 
cause and to divide society. In particular, the rhetoric of IS seeks to divide the Middle East from 
the West,  Shia Muslims from Sunni Muslims,  Muslims living in the West from non-Muslims, in 
a way that undermines what IS has called the “grey zone” of multiculturalism.    
Beyond these variants of classical public relations, IS has embraced digital marketing, data-analytics 
and search engine optimisation. Together, these tools deliver a computational form of public 
relations that uses algorithms and the optimisation of digital content to search online audiences, 
identify their interests, and then deliver messages to them directly. These extensions of process 
and technology are another feature of post-classical public relations and illustrate the diverse 
repertoire of techniques used by IS. Moreover, this multiplicity of approaches reflects the 
multidimensional nature of IS - as terror group, state and Islamic welfare operation - and the 
multiple propositions it offers to recruits. The use of transnational digital communications 
technology has been a key enabler of IS and skilful deployment of limited resources has enabled 
IS to generate what Maher (2015) has called a “carefully curated asymmetry of fear”.   
The online public relations value chain that generates this asymmetric advantage starts with the 
creation of digital artefacts of terror that are designed to cause outrage, such as the notorious early 
videos of Western fighters beheading Western hostages such as James Foley in August 2014 and 
the burning alive of captured Jordanian airline pilot, Moaz al-Kasasbeh in February 2015. The 
choreography of these incidents, with Orange jumpsuits used as reminder of the humiliation of 
Muslims in Guantanemo Bay, along with the soundtracks of Islamic chants and rhetorical 
declarations or war on the West is evidence of a media-aware performative dimension to IS’s visual 
communications. In the terms of performance studies theory, the decisions about what to include 
and what to leave out renders these artefacts as performance (Phelan, 1992, p. 31) and rather than 
live and natural recordings, the films are deliberately “mediatized” (Auslander, 2008,  p. 56) as part 
of the group’s communications management. IS has recognised that beyond the terror of the act 
of murder itself, widespread attention and impact can be generated through exaggerated 
dramatisation in which terrorists are performers in specially-designed media spectacles. That is to 
say, it is not enough just to be a terrorist and deliver acts of terrorism. In post-classical public 
relations, these realities are choreographed and performed in order to render them compelling 
enough to be shared for maximum communicative effect as digital performative artefacts 
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In considering its approach to managed communications, IS has combined message control with 
a digital liberalism in encouraging freedom in the use of social media that goes beyond two-way 
communication and embraces advocacy by its supporters. This mix of control of the core message 
(based on the strong ideological message structure) is balanced with freedom for a fragmented 
network of supporters to distribute existing material (through re-tweeting, for example). For 
fighters in the Islamic State itself, there is the opportunity to create their own digital content that 
communicates their personal experience of IS in their own national register and language, creating 
a truly global outreach. In classical PR, such uncontrolled advocacy might be considered a problem 
but for IS, it has been an asset enabling a vocal minority to achieve asymmetric effects. So while 
web tools such as Google Analytics go some way to enabling micro-targeting of recruits, this 
approach becomes realistic to execute through the efforts of supporter advocates who are willing 
to spend time both seeking out potential recruits and building an online relationship, leading to 
the decision to commit to action in some form, whether that be travelling to Syria or other 
involvement.  
Despite the Islamic State’s outlier status as a violent extremist group, the five common elements 
of post-classical public relations can be observed beyond terrorism settings in aspects of public 
communication in Western society during the time frame under study here (June 2014-June 2016). 
Although the political contexts are entirely different and there was obviously no terrorist action 
involved, some nationalistic political communications has deployed elements of post-classical 
public relations. For example, the level of certainty and conviction in the rhetoric of Donald 
Trump of the Republican Party, Nigel Farage of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 
Geert Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom and Marine Le Pen of the French National Front 
is closer to the high conviction rhetoric of IS than many conventional political parties. One long 
time Trump watcher, the US journalist Graydon Carter has described the President’s 
communications style as combining “ignorance and certitude” (Carter, 2017, p.53). Social media 
posts that seemed designed to cause outrage were a feature of what the head of the Leave.eu 
campaign Aaron Banks described as the “guerrilla war” campaign he fought using “the power of 
social media” (Banks, 2017, p. xxvi). In considering the performative element, it is significant that 
several of the political entrepreneurs to emerge in the last two years share experience of mass 
media, either as performers in reality television (Donald Trump), talk radio (Nigel Farage) or 
television comedy (Brexit campaigner Boris Johnson and Italian Beppe Grillo of the Five Star 
Movement), which helps explain why they are skilled at the performance of politics in ways that 
sustain media attention.  
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Conclusions and limitations  
Although digital media and online social networks are important to IS’s recruitment system, 
analysis of criminal cases coming to trial suggests that the strongest social network of all remains 
family and friends. Both the evidence from prosecutions (Crown Prosecution Service, 2016) and 
media accounts of young people still in Syria included cases of recruits who were known to each 
other before they travelled together to the caliphate, sometimes as man and wife, as brothers and 
sisters or as friendship groups. Based on a profound understanding of the different factors that 
lead to disengagement among young Muslims in the West, IS deploys an integrated system of 
recruitment communications that combines elements of public relations, social media marketing, 
digital content production and online messaging. The record of government-backed attempts to 
use a public relations approach in counter-measures, such as the UK Home Office’s attempts to 
promote “moderate Islam” and “social cohesion”, have not been well-received among the target 
Muslim communities, who rightly resent being the object of a process of state-backed and media-
supported securitisation. So in the current context of unconvincing countermeasures to IS 
recruitment messages and suspicion of government–backed initiatives in the USA, UK and other 
Western countries, there is potential for public relations techniques to be deployed in developing 
an improved understanding of the concerns of young people before designing communications 
outreach. In particular, a more thoughtful approach to stakeholder analysis could encourage 
campaigns that confront the feeling among young Muslims that they are positioned in Western 
society as outsiders who pose a threat to the majority, rather than a minority who seek to engage 
with the mainstream.   
The author aspired to a balanced and holistic perspective based on a broad spread of evidence but 
has been limited to material translated by extremist groups themselves for circulation in English 
or translations by monitors of extreme Islamic groups. While this approach made sense as the 
article focussed deliberately on the recruitment outreach in English to young people in the West, 
these remain a minority and so the article overlooked Arabic content used to recruit the bulk of 
IS fighters from Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other Middle Eastern countries, as well as 
Arab-speaking North Africa.  
Future work would be welcome on critiques, additions and refinements to the conceptual model 
of IS recruitment offered here, along with broader studies that map out the communications 
system of the Islamic State in its totality. Empirical testing of the model against the actual 
experience of recruits would be most valuable in precisely mapping the points and routes of 
engagement, but the dangers associated with fieldwork in Syria remain unsurmountable, online 
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research has validity issues and the potential research pool of returning fighters remains in low 
numbers.  The concept of a post-classical style of public relations and the five elements derived 
from the Islamic State’s communications outreach needs more development at the theoretical 
level.  Similarly, while the five characteristics derived here - a mixed repertoire of approaches; the 
rhetoric of certainty and division; computational and data-driven PR; online engagement and 
advocacy by supporters; a performative dimension to communications – seem viable on initial 
review in relation to populist political communications, they require field testing against more case 
studies of public relations and political communications to confirm their wider applicability.  
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